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A fuzzy game theoretic approach for groundwater resources management: Application of Rubinstein Bargaining Theory

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  • Kerachian, Reza
  • Fallahnia, Mahsa
  • Bazargan-Lari, Mohammad Reza
  • Mansoori, Abbas
  • Sedghi, Hossein

Abstract

Developing optimal operating policies for conjunctive use of surface and groundwater resources when different stakeholders with conflicting objectives are involved, is usually a challenging task. This problem would be more complex when objectives related to surface and groundwater quality are taken into account. In this study, a new methodology is proposed to resolve the conflict of interests among water users, water supply and environmental protection agencies which are involved in a problem of conjunctive use of surface and groundwater resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Kerachian, Reza & Fallahnia, Mahsa & Bazargan-Lari, Mohammad Reza & Mansoori, Abbas & Sedghi, Hossein, 2010. "A fuzzy game theoretic approach for groundwater resources management: Application of Rubinstein Bargaining Theory," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 54(10), pages 673-682.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:recore:v:54:y:2010:i:10:p:673-682
    DOI: 10.1016/j.resconrec.2009.11.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225, Elsevier.
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    1. Mehri Abdi-Dehkordi & Omid Bozorg-Haddad & Abdolrahim Salavitabar & Erfan Goharian, 2021. "Developing a sustainability assessment framework for integrated management of water resources systems using distributed zoning and system dynamics approaches," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 23(11), pages 16246-16282, November.

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