Benefit sharing: An incentive mechanism for social control of government expenditure
The present paper analyzes the incentives individual members of society face to contribute to a nation's efforts in controlling corruption. A Principal-Agent model is constructed, leading to the following results. First, although individual agents do have an interest in devoting a portion of their resources to the nation's control effort, the opportunity cost of the effort and a free rider problem blocks the spontaneous provision of individual support to corruption control. Second, to cope with those incentives, a new welfare improving mechanism is proposed, which aligns individual incentives with those of society at no extra cost to the government.
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- Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
- Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
- Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-41, January.
- Mohsin Habib & Leon Zurawicki, 2002. "Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 33(2), pages 291-307, June.
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