On the distribution of debt and taxes
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Alberto Alesina & Alessandro Prati & Guido Tabellini, 1989.
"Public Confidence and Debt Management: A Model and A Case Study of Italy,"
NBER Working Papers
3135, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, Alberto F & Prati, Alessandro & Tabellini, Guido, 1989. "Public Confidence and Debt Management: A Model and a Case Study of Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 351, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alesina, A. & Prati, A. & Tabellini, G., 1989. "Public Confidence And Debt Management: A Model And A Case Study Of Italy," Papers 5, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics.
- Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-419, June.
- Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-661, September.
- Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991.
"Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
- Drazen, Allan & Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Scholarly Articles 4553028, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275509, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, 1989. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?," NBER Working Papers 3053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Gian Maria Milesi‐Ferretti, 1995.
"Do Good Or Do Well? Public Debt Management In A Two‐Party Economy,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 59-78, March.
- G Milesi-Feretti, 1991. "Do Good or Do Well? Public Debt Management in a Two-Party Economy," CEP Discussion Papers dp0053, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Stefania Albanesi, "undated".
"The Time Consistency of Optimal Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents,"
Working Papers
207, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Stefania Albanesi, 2002. "The Time Consistency of Optimal Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents," Macroeconomics 0201003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Chamon, Marcos, 2007.
"Can debt crises be self-fulfilling?,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 234-244, January.
- Mr. Marcos d Chamon, 2004. "Can Debt Crises Be Self-Fulfilling?," IMF Working Papers 2004/099, International Monetary Fund.
- Seghezza, Elena & Morelli, Pierluigi, 2014. "Conflict inflation and delayed stabilization," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 171-184.
- Bassetto, Marco, 2005.
"Equilibrium and government commitment,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 79-105, September.
- Marco Bassetto, 2002. "Equilibrium and government commitment," Working Papers 624, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2018.
"Government Debt And Banking Fragility: The Spreading Of Strategic Uncertainty,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1905-1925, November.
- Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2013. "Government Debt and Banking Fragility: The Spreading of Strategic Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 19278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nikolov, Kalin & Cooper, Russell, 2018. "Government debt and banking fragility: the spreading of strategic uncertainty," Working Paper Series 2195, European Central Bank.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated".
"Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?,"
Working Papers
189, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What Are the Stylized Facts?," CESifo Working Paper Series 459, CESifo.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2001. "Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2872, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 412, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-95 debt crisis," Staff Report 210, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Chanelle Duley & Prasanna Gai, 2020. "When the penny doesn't drop - Macroeconomic tail risk and currency crises," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 520, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
- Honda, Jiro & Tapsoba, René & Issifou, Ismael, 2022.
"When do we repair the roof? Insights from responses to fiscal crisis early warning signals,"
International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 349-367.
- Mr. Jiro Honda & Rene Tapsoba & Ismael Issifou, 2018. "When Do We Repair the Roof? Insights from Responses to Fiscal Crisis Early Warning Signals," IMF Working Papers 2018/077, International Monetary Fund.
- Mats Persson & Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998.
"Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives: A Swedish Example,"
International Economic Association Series, in: Guillermo Calvo & Mervyn King (ed.), The Debt Burden and its Consequences for Monetary Policy, chapter 2, pages 28-66,
Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mats Persson & Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1996. "Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives: A Swedish Example," NBER Working Papers 5772, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Mats & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E.O., 1997. "Debt, cash flow and inflation incentives: A Swedish example," Seminar Papers 613, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Persson, M & Persson, T & Svensson, L-E-O, 1996. "Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives : A Swedish Example," Papers 613, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Persson, Mats & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1996. "Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives: A Swedish Example," CEPR Discussion Papers 1488, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pitlik, Hans & Wirth, Steffen, 2003. "Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization?: an empirical test," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 565-581, September.
- Giesenow, Federico M. & de Wit, Juliette & de Haan, Jakob, 2020. "The political and institutional determinants of fiscal adjustments and expansions: Evidence for a large set of countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
- Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 2000.
"Optimal currency crises,"
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 177-230, December.
- Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2000. "Optimal Currency Crises," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-23, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Dilla, Diana, 2017. "Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität [Public Debt and Debt Mentality]," MPRA Paper 79432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Baccini, Leonardo & Urpelainen, Johannes, 2012. "Legislative fractionalization and partisan shifts to the left increase the volatility of public energy R&D expenditures," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 45571, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Fernando A. Broner & Guido Lorenzoni & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2013.
"Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11, pages 67-100, January.
- Fernando Broner & Guido Lorenzoni & Sergio L. Schmukler, "undated". "Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?," Working Papers 308, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Broner, Fernando A. & Lorenzoni, Guido & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2004. "Why do emerging economies borrow short term?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3389, The World Bank.
- Fernando A. Broner & Guido Lorenzoni & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2007. "Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?," NBER Working Papers 13076, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fernando Broner & Guido Lorenzoni & Sergio Schmuckler, 2006. "Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?," 2006 Meeting Papers 841, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Schmukler, Sergio & Broner, Fernando & Lorenzoni, Guido, 2007. "Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fernando Broner & Guido Lorenzoni & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2003. "Why do emerging economies borrow short term?," Economics Working Papers 838, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2011.
- Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2021.
"Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 583-610, November.
- Gilles Saint-Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2017. "Engineering Crises: Favoritism and Strategic Fiscal Indiscipline," PSE Working Papers halshs-01584043, HAL.
- Saint-Paul, Gilles & Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2017. "Engineering Crises: Favoritism and Strategic Fiscal Indiscipline," CEPR Discussion Papers 12291, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gilles Saint-Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2021. "Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03324854, HAL.
- Gilles Saint-Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2021. "Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline," Post-Print halshs-03324854, HAL.
- Gilles Saint-Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2017. "Engineering Crises: Favoritism and Strategic Fiscal Indiscipline," CESifo Working Paper Series 6657, CESifo.
- Gilles Saint-Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2017. "Engineering Crises: Favoritism and Strategic Fiscal Indiscipline," Working Papers halshs-01584043, HAL.
- Ronit Mukherji, 2023. "Risk Sharing in Public-Private Partnerships," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 1-17, December.
- Ziogas, Thanasis & Panagiotidis, Theodore, 2021. "Revisiting the political economy of fiscal adjustments," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
- de Haan, Jakob & Sturm, Jan-Egbert, 1997. "Political and economic determinants of OECD budget deficits and government expenditures: A reinvestigation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 739-750, December.
- Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2006.
"Sovereign Debt: Indexation and Maturity,"
Research Department Publications
4459, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Alfaro, Laura & Kanczuk, Fabio, 2006. "Sovereign Debt: Indexation and Maturity," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1578, Inter-American Development Bank.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:65:y:1997:i:3:p:367-386. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.