On the distribution of debt and taxes
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- Stefania Albanesi, "undated".
"The Time Consistency of Optimal Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents,"
Working Papers
207, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Stefania Albanesi, 2002. "The Time Consistency of Optimal Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents," Macroeconomics 0201003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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