Why voters may prefer congested public clubs
Governmental facilities for such services as education, health, and transportation are often small, of poor quality, and overcrowded, even when the costs are spread among all taxpayers. We also find that governments may subsidize private facilities providing the same services, or may charge admission fees at public facilities. We explain these phenomena with a model which considers two types of people, rich and poor. A majority consisting of poor people may purposely build small and low quality facilities to discourage use by the rich, thereby lowering taxes. For the same reason, the poor may benefit from an admission fee at public clubs, or even from a subsidy to private clubs they do not use.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Sonstelie, Jon, 1982. "The Welfare Cost of Free Public Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 794-808, August.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1989.
"Public Provision Of Private Goods And The Redistribution Of Income,"
36, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1991. "Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 979-84, September.
- Stiglitz, J. E., 1974. "The demand for education in public and private school systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 349-385, November.
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