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Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation

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  • Friedman, Daniel
  • Wittman, Donald

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  • Friedman, Daniel & Wittman, Donald, 1995. "Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 67-83, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:57:y:1995:i:1:p:67-83
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dick, Andrew R. & Lott, John Jr., 1993. "Reconciling voters' behavior with legislative term limits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-14, January.
    2. Lott, John R, Jr & Bronars, Stephen G, 1993. "Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 125-149, June.
    3. Adams, James D & Kenny, Lawrence W, 1986. "Optimal Tenure of Elected Public Officials," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 303-328, October.
    4. Ferejohn, John A., 1977. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 166-176, March.
    5. Kallenbach, Joseph E., 1952. "Constitutional Limitations on Reëligibility of National and State Chief Executives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 438-454, June.
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    1. Nahapetyan Yervand, 2019. "The benefits of the Velvet Revolution in Armenia: Estimation of the short-term economic gains using deep neural networks," Central European Economic Journal, Sciendo, vol. 6(53), pages 286-303, January.
    2. Daniel J. Smith & George R. Crowley & J. Sebastian Leguizamon, 2021. "Long live the doge? Death as a term limit on Venetian chief executives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 333-359, September.
    3. Edward López & R. Jewell, 2007. "Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 137-157, July.
    4. Yakovlev, Pavel A. & Tosun, Mehmet S. & Lewis, William P., 2018. "The Fiscal Consequences of State Legislative Term Limits," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 48(3), January.
    5. Akhmed Akhmedov, 2006. "Human Capital and Political Business Cycles," Working Papers w0087, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    6. Schelker, Mark, 2018. "Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 131-144.
    7. Rodet, Cortney S., 2015. "An experiment in political trust," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 17-25.
    8. Antonio Abatemarco & Roberto Dell’Anno, 2020. "Fiscal illusion and progressive taxation with retrospective voting," Economic and Political Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(2), pages 246-273, April.
    9. Kwang-ho Kim, 2013. "A Drawback of Political Accountability," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 29, pages 405-428.
    10. Germà Bel & Antonio Miralles, 2010. "Choosing between Service Fees and Budget Funding to Pay for Local Services: Empirical Evidence from Spain," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 28(1), pages 54-71, February.
    11. Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015. "Political entry, public policies, and the economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
    12. Rodet, Cortney S., 2011. "Voter Behavior and Seniority Advantage in Pork Barrel Politics," MPRA Paper 33192, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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