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Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation

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Listed author(s):
  • Friedman, Daniel
  • Wittman, Donald

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0047-2727(94)01436-R
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 57 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 67-83

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:57:y:1995:i:1:p:67-83
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Dick, Andrew R. & Lott, John Jr., 1993. "Reconciling voters' behavior with legislative term limits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-14, January.
  2. Lott, John R, Jr & Bronars, Stephen G, 1993. "Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 125-149, June.
  3. Adams, James D & Kenny, Lawrence W, 1986. "Optimal Tenure of Elected Public Officials," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 303-328, October.
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Cited by:

  1. Mark Schelker, 2011. "Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable," CESifo Working Paper Series 3523, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Akhmed Akhmedov, 2006. "Human Capital and Political Business Cycles," Working Papers w0087, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  3. Germà Bel & Antonio Miralles, 2010. "Choosing between service fees and budget funding to pay for local services: empirical evidence from Spain," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 28(1), pages 54-71, February.
  4. Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015. "Political entry, public policies, and the economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
  5. Rodet, Cortney S., 2011. "Voter Behavior and Seniority Advantage in Pork Barrel Politics," MPRA Paper 33192, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Edward López & R. Jewell, 2007. "Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 137-157, July.
  7. Rodet, Cortney S., 2015. "An experiment in political trust," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 17-25.

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