Can gender quotas break the glass ceiling? Evidence from Italian municipal elections

Do gender quotas promote the election of female mayors? I exploit the roll-out of three gender quota policies governing Italian municipal elections to answer this question. The quotas institute minimum legal levels of female representation in the lists of councilor candidates and in the municipal governments' executive bodies, but do not directly target mayoral positions. Therefore, their ability to promote female political leadership entirely depends on whether they induce a broader increase in female representation in municipal governments beyond that mechanically required by the law. Using event-study and regression discontinuity methods, I decompose the aggregate effects of the quotas into mechanical effects, driven by compliance with the law, and additional impacts, or “acceleration effects.” The reforms have increased the share of female politicians in the less senior government positions beyond the minimum legal level, but there is no evidence of effects on the mayoral position. I also find no evidence of effects on female mayoral candidacies or on electoral support for female mayoral candidates. I conclude that the acceleration effects produced by the quotas have been too weak to advance female political leadership in municipal governments.