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Gender Equality Through Turnover : Quasi-experimental Evidence from Term Limit Reforms in Italy

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  • Kansikas, Carolina

    (University of Warwick)

  • Bagues, Manuel

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

We study whether term limits can accelerate women’s access to top political positions by analyzing two reforms in Italian local elections that extended mayoral term limits from two to three five-year terms. In a period marked by rapid growth in women’s political participation, the first reform affected municipalities with fewer than 3,000 inhabitants in 2014, and the second those below 5,000 in 2022. Using a difference-in-discontinuities design, we find that longer term limits restrict opportunities for early-career politicians, with substantial effects for female representation: the share of female mayors would be 8 percentage points higher without the term limit extensions. The impact is larger in municipalities with more women in lower political positions and where gender quotas for council members are present, suggesting that entry-level quotas can be more effective when paired with policies promoting turnover in top positions.

Suggested Citation

  • Kansikas, Carolina & Bagues, Manuel, 2025. "Gender Equality Through Turnover : Quasi-experimental Evidence from Term Limit Reforms in Italy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1573, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1573
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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2025/twerp_1573-_bagues.pdf
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    JEL classification:

    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
    • J48 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Particular Labor Markets; Public Policy
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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