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Effect of the depreciation of public goods in spatial public goods games

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  • Shi, Dong-Mei
  • Zhuang, Yong
  • Wang, Bing-Hong

Abstract

In this work, the depreciation effect of public goods is considered in the public goods games, which is realized by rescaling the multiplication factor r of each group as r′=r(ncG)β (β≥0). It is assumed that each individual enjoys the full profit r of the public goods if all the players of this group are cooperators. Otherwise, the value of public goods is reduced to r′. It is found that compared with the original version (β=0), the emergence of cooperation is remarkably promoted for β>0, and there exist intermediate values of β inducing the best cooperation. Particularly, there exists a range of β inducing the highest cooperative level, and this range of β broadens as r increases. It is further presented that the variation of cooperator density with noise has close relations with the values of β and r, and cooperation at an intermediate value of β=1.0 is most tolerant to noise.

Suggested Citation

  • Shi, Dong-Mei & Zhuang, Yong & Wang, Bing-Hong, 2012. "Effect of the depreciation of public goods in spatial public goods games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 391(4), pages 1636-1641.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:391:y:2012:i:4:p:1636-1641
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2011.10.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lu, Peng, 2015. "Learn good from bad: Effects of good and bad neighbors in spatial prisoners’ dilemma games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 436(C), pages 351-358.
    2. Lu, Peng, 2015. "Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 39-46.
    3. Lu, Peng & Wang, Fang, 2015. "Heterogeneity of inferring reputation probability in cooperative behaviors for the spatial prisoners’ dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 433(C), pages 367-378.
    4. Lu, Peng, 2015. "Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners’ dilemma games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 436(C), pages 327-337.
    5. Shi, Dong-Mei & Wang, Bing-Hong, 2017. "Critical mass of public goods and its coevolution with cooperation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 477(C), pages 85-90.

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