Profit maximization, industry structure, and competition: A critique of neoclassical theory
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- Steve Keen & Russell K. Standish, 2006. "Profit Maximization, Industry Structure, and Competition: A critique of neoclassical theory," Papers nlin/0604061, arXiv.org.
References listed on IDEAS
- Keen, Steve, 2004. "Deregulator: Judgment Day for microeconomics," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 109-125, September.
- Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
- George J. Stigler, 1957. "Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 1-1.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Anglin, Paul, 2008. "On the proper behavior of atoms: A comment on a critique," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(1), pages 277-280.
- Barreira da Silva Rocha, André, 2013.
"Evolutionary dynamics of nationalism and migration,"
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,
Elsevier, vol. 392(15), pages 3183-3197.
- André Barreira da Silva Rocha, 2012. "Evolutionary Dynamics of Nationalism and Migration," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/11, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Jun 2012.
- Russell K. Standish & Stephen L. Keen, 2015. "Rationality in the Theory of the Firm," World Economic Review, World Economics Association, vol. 2015(5), pages 101-101, July.
- Bell, William Paul, 2009. "Adaptive interactive expectations: dynamically modelling profit expectations," MPRA Paper 38260, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Feb 2010.
- David Rosnick, 2015. "Toward an Understanding of Keen and Standish's Theory of the Firm: A Comment," World Economic Review, World Economics Association, vol. 2015(5), pages 107-107, July.
- Segismundo S. Izquierdo & Luis R. Izquierdo, 2015. "The “Win-Continue, Lose-Reverse” Rule In Oligopolies: Robustness Of Collusive Outcomes," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(05n06), pages 1-23, August.
More about this item
KeywordsMicroeconomics; Profit maximization; Competition; Monopoly; Oligopoly; Cournot–Nash game theory;
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