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Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments

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  • Mills, David Jr.

Abstract

I explore alternative central bank credit policies in a theoretical model where (i) money is necessary as a means of payment, (ii) there is a shortage of liquidity that a central bank addresses through the extension of credit, (iii) money is necessary to repay debts, and (iv) the incentives to default are explicit and contingent on the credit policy designed. Using a mechanism design approach, I compare a credit policy of charging an interest rate on credit (like the Federal Reserve's policy) with that of requiring the posting of collateral (like the European Central Bank's policy). I find that the pricing policy can implement good allocations while the collateral policy cannot whenever collateral bears an opportunity cost
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  • Mills, David Jr., 2006. "Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1593-1611, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:53:y:2006:i:7:p:1593-1611
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    Cited by:

    1. Ewerhart, Christian & Tapking, Jens, 2008. "Repo markets, counterparty risk and the 2007/2008 liquidity crisis," Working Paper Series 909, European Central Bank.
    2. Jean-Marc Figuet, 2009. "La mise en place de TARGET2 : un élément de la nouvelle architecture financière de l’économie européenne," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 94(1), pages 329-338.
    3. Lester Benjamin, 2009. "Settlement Systems," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, pages 1-35.
    4. Huberto M. Ennis & John A. Weinberg, 2007. "Interest on reserves and daylight credit," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 111-142.
    5. Philipp Bagus & David Howden, 2012. "Still unanswered quibbles with fractional reserve free banking," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(2), pages 159-171, June.
    6. Baglioni, Angelo & Monticini, Andrea, 2010. "The intraday interest rate under a liquidity crisis: The case of August 2007," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 198-200, May.
    7. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Haslag, Joseph H. & Martin, Antoine, 2009. "Why does overnight liquidity cost more than intraday liquidity?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1236-1246, June.
    8. ANTOINE MARTIN & JAMES McANDREWS, 2010. "Should There Be Intraday Money Markets?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 110-122, January.
    9. Benjamin Lester, 2006. "A Model of Interbank Settlement," 2006 Meeting Papers 282, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2005. "Mechanism Design and Payments," 2005 Meeting Papers 11, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Jonathan Chiu & Alexandra Lai, 2007. "Modelling Payments Systems: A Review of the Literature," Staff Working Papers 07-28, Bank of Canada.
    12. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2009. "Why pay? An introduction to payments economics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-23, January.
    13. Chao Gu & Joseph Haslag, 2014. "Unconventional Optimal Open Market Purchases," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(3), pages 543-558, July.
    14. Fujiki, Hiroshi, 2014. "Institutional designs to alleviate liquidity shortages in a two-country model," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, pages 32-46.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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