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Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

Author

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  • JAMES T.E. CHAPMAN
  • ANTOINE MARTIN

Abstract

In a 1999 paper, Freeman proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations have different outcomes - an important development because in most of the literature the results of these policy tools are indistinguishable. Freeman's conclusion that the central bank should absorb losses related to default to provide risk-sharing goes against the concern that central banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman's model by introducing moral hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses, contrary to Freeman's argument. However, we show that the outcomes of discount window lending and open market operations can still be distinguished in this new framework. The optimal policy would be for the central bank to make a restricted number of creditors compete for funds. By restricting the number of agents, the central bank can limit the moral hazard problem. And by making agents compete with each other, the central bank can exploit market information that reveals the state of the economy.
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Suggested Citation

  • James T.E. Chapman & Antoine Martin, 2013. "Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 651-674, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:45:y:2013:i:4:p:651-674
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hajime Tomura, 2019. "On Separation between Payment and Saving Instruments," Working Papers 1813, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    2. Tomura, Hajime, 2018. "Payment instruments and collateral in the interbank payment system," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 82-104.
    3. ANTOINE MARTIN & JAMES McANDREWS, 2010. "Should There Be Intraday Money Markets?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 110-122, January.
    4. Gu, Chao & Guzman, Mark & Haslag, Joseph, 2011. "Production, hidden action, and the payment system," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 172-182, March.
    5. repec:upd:utppwp:036 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:upd:utppwp:056 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Fujiki, Hiroshi, 2014. "Institutional designs to alleviate liquidity shortages in a two-country model," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 32-46.
    8. Hiroshi Fujiki, 2013. "Policy Measures to Alleviate Foreign Currency Liquidity Shortages under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 64(4), pages 504-536, December.
    9. Hajime Tomura, 2019. "Imperfect Contract Enforcement and Nominal Liabilities," Working Papers 1905, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    10. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2009. "Payments Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(5), pages 855-884, August.
    11. Hajime Tomura, 2021. "Nominal contracts and the payment system," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 185-216, April.
    12. Vincent Bignon & Clemens Jobst, 2017. "Economic Crises and the Eligibility for the Lender of Last Resort: Evidence from 19th century France," Working papers 618, Banque de France.
    13. Biliana Alexandrova Kabadjova & Anton Badev & Saulo Benchimol Bastos & Evangelos Benos & Freddy Cepeda- Lopéz & James Chapman & Martin Diehl & Ioana Duca-Radu & Rodney Garratt & Ronald Heijmans & Anne, 2023. "Intraday liquidity around the world," BIS Working Papers 1089, Bank for International Settlements.
    14. James Chapman & Jonathan Chiu & Miguel Molico, 2011. "Central bank haircut policy," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 319-348, August.
    15. James Chapman & Jonathan Chiu & Miguel Molico, 2013. "A Model of Tiered Settlement Networks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(2‐3), pages 327-347, March.
    16. repec:upd:utppwp:032 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Bignon, Vincent & Avaro, Maylis, 2019. "At Your Service! Liquidity Provision and Risk Management in 19th Century France," CEPR Discussion Papers 13556, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. repec:upd:utppwp:072 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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