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Central bank haircut policy


  • James Chapman


  • Jonathan Chiu


  • Miguel Molico



We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral. Setting a haircut therefore involves balancing the trade-off between relaxing the liquidity constraints of agents on one hand, and increasing potential inflation risk and distorting the portfolio choices of agents on the other. We argue that the optimal haircut is higher when the central bank is unable to lend exclusively to agents who actually need liquidity. Finally, for an unexpected drop in the haircut, the central bank can be more aggressive than when setting a permanent level of the haircut.
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Suggested Citation

  • James Chapman & Jonathan Chiu & Miguel Molico, 2011. "Central bank haircut policy," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 319-348, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:annfin:v:7:y:2011:i:3:p:319-348 DOI: 10.1007/s10436-010-0171-5

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
    2. Martin, Antoine & Monnet, Cyril, 2011. "Monetary Policy Implementation Frameworks: A Comparative Analysis," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(S1), pages 145-189, April.
    3. Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2005. "A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 463-484, June.
    4. Koeppl, Thorsten & Monnet, Cyril & Temzelides, Ted, 2008. "A dynamic model of settlement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 233-246, September.
    5. Berentsen, Aleksander & Monnet, Cyril, 2008. "Monetary policy in a channel system," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 1067-1080, September.
    6. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Haslag, Joseph H. & Martin, Antoine, 2009. "Why does overnight liquidity cost more than intraday liquidity?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1236-1246, June.
    7. Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
    8. James T.E. Chapman & Antoine Martin, 2013. "Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 651-674, June.
    9. ANTOINE MARTIN & JAMES McANDREWS, 2010. "Should There Be Intraday Money Markets?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 110-122, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wolski, Marcin & van de Leur, Michiel, 2016. "Interbank loans, collateral and modern monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 388-416.
    2. repec:eee:jbfina:v:83:y:2017:i:c:p:232-248 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Aleksander Berentsen & Alessandro Marchesiani & Christopher Waller, 2014. "Floor Systems for Implementing Monetary Policy: Some Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(3), pages 523-542, July.
    4. Bindseil, Ulrich & Jabłecki, Juliusz, 2013. "Central bank liquidity provision, risk-taking and economic efficiency," Working Paper Series 1542, European Central Bank.
    5. Nyborg, Kjell G., 2017. "Central bank collateral frameworks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 198-214.
    6. Sylvia Xiao & Randall Wright & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2017. "Open Market Operations," 2017 Meeting Papers 345, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69, November.
    8. Fuhrer, Lucas Marc & Müller, Benjamin & Steiner, Luzian, 2017. "The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and security prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 292-311.
    9. Sever, Can, 2014. "Systemic Liquidity Crisis with Dynamic Haircuts," MPRA Paper 55602, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item


    Collateral; Haircut; Liquidity; Central bank; Monetary policy; Search theory; E40; E42; E50;

    JEL classification:

    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General


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