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Central Bank Haircut Policy

Author

Listed:
  • James Chapman
  • Jonathan Chiu
  • Miguel Molico

Abstract

We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral. Setting a haircut therefore involves balancing the trade-off between relaxing the liquidity constraints of agents on one hand, and increasing potential inflation risk and distorting the portfolio choices of agents on the other. We argue that the optimal haircut is higher when the central bank is unable to lend exclusively to agents who actually need liquidity. Finally, for an unexpected drop in the haircut, the central bank can be more aggressive than when setting a permanent level of the haircut.

Suggested Citation

  • James Chapman & Jonathan Chiu & Miguel Molico, 2010. "Central Bank Haircut Policy," Staff Working Papers 10-23, Bank of Canada.
    • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:10-23
    DOI: 10.34989/swp-2010-23
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    Cited by:

    1. Nyborg, Kjell G., 2017. "Reprint of: Central bank collateral frameworks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 232-248.
    2. Aleksander Berentsen & Alessandro Marchesiani & Christopher Waller, 2014. "Floor Systems for Implementing Monetary Policy: Some Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(3), pages 523-542, July.
    3. Bindseil, Ulrich & Jabłecki, Juliusz, 2013. "Central bank liquidity provision, risk-taking and economic efficiency," Working Paper Series 1542, European Central Bank.
    4. Hüttl, Pia & Kaldorf, Matthias, 2024. "The transmission of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from the Eurosystem collateral framework," Discussion Papers 04/2024, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    5. Nguyen, Minh, 2020. "Collateral haircuts and bond yields in the European government bond markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    6. Nyborg, Kjell G., 2017. "Central bank collateral frameworks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 198-214.
    7. Kaldorf, Matthias & Wicknig, Florian, 2021. "Risky Financial Collateral, Firm Heterogeneity, and the Impact of Eligibility Requirements," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242413, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Rocheteau, Guillaume & Wright, Randall & Xiaolin Xiao, Sylvia, 2018. "Open market operations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 114-128.
    9. Matsuoka, Tarishi, 2022. "Asset prices and standing facilities in a monetary economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    10. Ulrich Bindseil & Edoardo Lanari, 2020. "Fire Sales, the LOLR and Bank Runs with Continuous Asset Liquidity," Papers 2010.11030, arXiv.org.
    11. Lanari, Edoardo, 2022. "Fire Sales, the LOLR, and Bank Runs with Continuous Asset Liquidity," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 4(4), pages 77-102, April.
    12. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69, July.
    13. Bindseil, Ulrich & Jablecki, Juliusz, 2023. "Zombification and Central Bank Risk-Taking: The Lender of Last Resort as a Signal Extraction Problem," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 5(3), pages 1-22, July.
    14. Fuhrer, Lucas Marc & Müller, Benjamin & Steiner, Luzian, 2017. "The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and security prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 292-311.
    15. Wolski, Marcin & van de Leur, Michiel, 2016. "Interbank loans, collateral and modern monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 388-416.
    16. Sever, Can, 2014. "Systemic Liquidity Crisis with Dynamic Haircuts," MPRA Paper 55602, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Geng, Guangjie & Cheng, Miao & Chen, Mingwei, 2025. "Collateral eligibility of credit claims and bank liquidity creation: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    18. Enchuan Shao & Kwabena Bediako, 2020. "The Impact Of Return On Collateral In A Channel System," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(3), pages 1314-1341, July.
    19. Jakob Vestergaard & Daniela Gabor, 2021. "Central Banks Caught Between Market Liquidity and Fiscal Disciplining: A Money View Perspective on Collateral Policy," Working Papers Series inetwp170, Institute for New Economic Thinking.

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    JEL classification:

    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General

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