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Settlement bank behaviour and throughput rules in an RTGS payment system with collateralised intraday credit

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  • Simon Buckle
  • Erin Campbell

Abstract

A simple two-period, two-bank model of an RTGS system with collateralised intraday credit is presented. It is shown that two types of outcome are possible - inefficient or efficient - depending on whether banks care about payments imbalances between them in the first period. If they do, banks delay payments to each other, increasing their aggregate liquidity requirements. It is argued that efficiency is not guaranteed even when banks face repeated interaction in a real payment system, largely because of imperfect information and the competitive dynamics of the payment industry. An efficient outcome can be achieved by the imposition of throughput rules on the value of payments banks must make by a certain deadline. These can both reduce aggregate liquidity requirements and increase the contestability of the payments market, encouraging a higher degree of direct access to payment systems. Throughput rules could therefore also have risk-reduction benefits if they help to reduce the level of tiering in the financial system. The detailed characteristics of these rules are shown to be important, and a number of design issues are addressed, such as how frequently requirements should be set, and whether throughput rules should apply on an aggregate or bilateral basis.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Buckle & Erin Campbell, 2003. "Settlement bank behaviour and throughput rules in an RTGS payment system with collateralised intraday credit," Bank of England working papers 209, Bank of England.
  • Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:209
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    File URL: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/workingpapers/2003/wp209.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Edward J. Green, 1999. "Money and debt in the structure of payments," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Spr, pages 13-29.
    2. Ruilin Zhou, 2000. "Understanding intraday credit in large-value payment systems," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q III, pages 29-44.
    3. Angelini, Paolo, 1998. "An analysis of competitive externalities in gross settlement systems," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-18, January.
    4. Bech, Morten L. & Garratt, Rod, 2003. "The intraday liquidity management game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 198-219, April.
    5. Freeman, Scott, 1996. "The Payments System, Liquidity, and Rediscounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1126-1138, December.
    6. Edward J. Green & James J. McAndrews & Arthur J. Rolnick & James B. Thomson, 1999. "Panel discussion: thoughts on the future of payments and central banking," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 668-681.
    7. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Controlling risk in payment systems," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 832-869.
    8. Kobayakawa, Shuji, 1997. "The Comparative Analysis of Settlement Systems," CEPR Discussion Papers 1667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2001. "Real-time gross settlement and the costs of immediacy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 299-319, April.
    10. James J. McAndrews & Samira Rajan, 2000. "The timing and funding of Fedwire funds transfers," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Jul, pages 17-32.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cronin, David, 2011. "Large-Value Payment System Design and Risk Management," Quarterly Bulletin Articles, Central Bank of Ireland, pages 78-88, January.
    2. Galbiati, Marco & Soramäki, Kimmo, 2011. "An agent-based model of payment systems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 859-875, June.
    3. Ball, Alan & Denbee, Edward & Manning, Mark & Wetherilt, Anne, 2011. "Financial Stability Paper No 11: Intraday Liquidity - Risk and Regulation," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 11, Bank of England.
    4. Leinonen, Harry, 2009. "Simulation analyses and stress testing of payment networks," Scientific Monographs, Bank of Finland, number 2009_042, November.
    5. Norman, Ben, 2010. "Financial Stability Paper No 7: Liquidity Saving in Real-Time Gross Settlement Systems - an Overview," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 7, Bank of England.
    6. Schulz, Christian, 2011. "Liquidity requirements and payment delays - participant type dependent preferences," Working Paper Series 1291, European Central Bank.
    7. Tomohiro Ota, 2016. "Sequential payments and optimal pricing in payment systems," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 441-463, December.

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