The buy price in auctions with discrete type distributions
This paper considers second-price, sealed-bid auctions with a buy price where bidders' types are discretely distributed. We characterize all equilibria in which bidders whose types are less than the buy price bid their own valuations. Budish and Takeyama (2001) analyze the two-bidder, two-type framework. They show that if bidders are risk-averse, then the seller can obtain a higher expected revenue from the auction with a certain buy price than from the auction without a buy price. We extend their revenue improvement result to the n-bidder, two-type framework. In case of three or more types, however, bidders' risk aversion is not a sufficient condition for a revenue improvement. We point out that even if bidders are risk-averse, the seller cannot always obtain a higher expected revenue from the auctions with a buy price.
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