Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player
The paper contributes to the perfect Bayesian implementation problem when the planner selects an outcome after agents send a signal profile. In our problem, the planner always selects the outcomes that maximize her expected utility, given her posterior belief about the state. The paper explicitly models the problem and shows a full characterization of SCF set that can be perfect Bayesian implemented in FGP equilibrium.
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- Baliga, S. & Corchon, L.C. & Sjostrom, T., 1995.
"The Theory of Implemetation when the Planner is a PLayer,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
9512, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Baliga, Sandeep & Corchon, Luis C. & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1997. "The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 15-33, November.
- Luis Corchón & Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 1995. "The Theory Of Implementation When The Planner Is A Player," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1999.
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 38-63, April.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996. "Interactive Implementation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1751, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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