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Implementation of voting operators

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  • Stefanescu, Anton
  • Ferrara, Massimiliano

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  • Stefanescu, Anton & Ferrara, Massimiliano, 2006. "Implementation of voting operators," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 315-324, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:42:y:2006:i:3:p:315-324
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aleskerov, Fuad, 2002. "Categories of arrovian voting schemes," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 95-129, Elsevier.
    2. Yamato, Takehiko, 1992. "On nash implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 484-492, July.
    3. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
    4. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-1151, November.
    5. Aizerman, M. A. & Aleskerov, F. T., 1986. "Voting operators in the space of choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 201-242, June.
    6. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
    7. Lahiri, Somdeb, 2001. "Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-238, March.
    8. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
    9. Stefanescu, Anton, 1997. "Impossibility results for choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 129-148, April.
    10. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
    11. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Monica Patriche, 2017. "Existence of the Equilibrium in Choice," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 158-171, October.
    2. Riccardi, R. & Bonenti, F. & Allevi, E. & Avanzi, C. & Gnudi, A., 2015. "The steel industry: A mathematical model under environmental regulations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(3), pages 1017-1027.
    3. Anton Stefanescu & Massimiliano Ferrara & Maria Viorica Stefanescu, 2012. "Equilibria of the Games in Choice Form," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 1060-1072, December.

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