IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/joepsy/v112y2026ics0167487025000820.html

Paying none, some or all? Between-subject random incentives and preferences towards risk and time

Author

Listed:
  • Berlin, Noémi
  • Kemel, Emmanuel
  • Lenglin, Vincent
  • Nebout, Antoine

Abstract

In the context of risk and time preferences, the within-subject random incentive system (Within-RIS) is the standard real-incentive mechanism in economic experiments: each subject has one choice randomly selected for payment. In a variation, Within-RIS is applied to a fraction of subjects only: each subject has a probability π of being selected and has one choice randomly selected for payment. This paper assesses the validity of this mechanism called the hybrid random incentive system (Hybrid-RIS) by investigating if/how the selection probability affects elicited risk and time preferences. We report an experiment conducted with 335 subjects across four treatments, varying the selection probability to 0, 0.1, 0.5, and 1. Using raw data statistics and structural estimations of preference parameters, we find that elicited time preferences remain stable, while risk aversion is lower when the selection probability is null. However, there are no significant differences among the non-null selection probabilities. These findings suggest that Hybrid-RIS does not distort elicited risk and time preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Berlin, Noémi & Kemel, Emmanuel & Lenglin, Vincent & Nebout, Antoine, 2026. "Paying none, some or all? Between-subject random incentives and preferences towards risk and time," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:112:y:2026:i:c:s0167487025000820
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102870
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487025000820
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.joep.2025.102870?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emmanuel Kemel & Corina Paraschiv, 2023. "Risking the future? Measuring risk attitudes towards delayed consequences," Post-Print hal-04385738, HAL.
    2. Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1993. "Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(2), pages 245-261, April.
    3. Aydogan, Ilke & Berger, Loïc & Théroude, Vincent, 2024. "Pay all subjects or pay only some? An experiment on decision-making under risk and ambiguity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    4. Baillon, Aurélien & Bleichrodt, Han & Granic, Georg D., 2022. "Incentives in surveys," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    5. Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
    6. Nicholas Bardsley & Robin Cubitt & Graham Loomes & Peter Moffatt & Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, 2009. "Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9074, December.
    7. Helga Fehr-Duda & Adrian Bruhin & Thomas Epper & Renate Schubert, 2010. "Rationality on the rise: Why relative risk aversion increases with stake size," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 147-180, April.
    8. Lisa R. Anderson & Beth A. Freeborn & Patrick McAlvanah & Andrew Turscak, 2023. "Pay every subject or pay only some?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 161-188, April.
    9. Bolle, Friedel, 1990. "High reward experiments without high expenditure for the experimenter?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 157-167, June.
    10. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    11. Paolo Crosetto & Antonio Filippin, 2016. "A theoretical and experimental appraisal of four risk elicitation methods," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(3), pages 613-641, September.
    12. Robin Cubitt & Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, 1998. "On the Validity of the Random Lottery Incentive System," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(2), pages 115-131, September.
    13. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Cédric Gutierrez & Emmanuel Kemel, 2018. "Temporal discounting of gains and losses of time: An experimental investigation," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 1-28, August.
    14. Weber, Bethany J. & Chapman, Gretchen B., 2005. "The combined effects of risk and time on choice: Does uncertainty eliminate the immediacy effect? Does delay eliminate the certainty effect?," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 104-118, March.
    15. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Halladay, Brianna, 2016. "Experimental methods: Pay one or pay all," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 141-150.
    16. Brokesova, Zuzana & Deck, Cary & Peliova, Jana, 2017. "Comparing a risky choice in the field and across lab procedures," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 203-212.
    17. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
    18. Mujcic, Redzo & Powdthavee, Nattavudh, 2025. "How do humans respond to large realized losses?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    19. Sefton, Martin, 1992. "Incentives in simple bargaining games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 263-276, June.
    20. Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1991. "Does the Random-Lottery Incentive System Elicit True Preferences? An Experimental Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 971-978, September.
    21. Abdellaoui, Mohammed & Kemel, Emmanuel & Panin, Amma & Vieider, Ferdinand M., 2019. "Measuring time and risk preferences in an integrated framework," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 459-469.
    22. A. Nebout & D. Dubois, 2014. "When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the common ratio effect," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 19-49, February.
    23. Oberholzer, Yvonne & Olschewski, Sebastian & Scheibehenne, Benjamin, 2024. "Complexity aversion in risky choices and valuations: Moderators and possible causes," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    24. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Han Bleichrodt & Olivier l'Haridon & Corina Paraschiv, 2013. "Is There One Unifying Concept of Utility?An Experimental Comparison of Utility Under Risk and Utility Over Time," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(9), pages 2153-2169, September.
    25. Kemel, Emmanuel & Paraschiv, Corina, 2023. "Risking the future? Measuring risk attitudes towards delayed consequences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 325-344.
    26. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
    27. Kachelmeier, Steven J & Shehata, Mohamed, 1992. "Examining Risk Preferences under High Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People's Republic of China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1120-1141, December.
    28. Pablo Brañas-Garza & Diego Jorrat & Antonio M. Espín & Angel Sánchez, 2023. "Paid and hypothetical time preferences are the same: lab, field and online evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(2), pages 412-434, April.
    29. Umer, Hamza, 2023. "Effectiveness of random payment in Experiments: A meta-Analysis of dictator games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    30. Yaron Azrieli & Christopher P. Chambers & Paul J. Healy, 2018. "Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1472-1503.
    31. Yaron Azrieli & Christopher P. Chambers & Paul J. Healy, 2020. "Incentives in experiments with objective lotteries," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(1), pages 1-29, March.
    32. Eyal Ert & Ido Erev, 2013. "On the descriptive value of loss aversion in decisions under risk: Six clarifications," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 8(3), pages 214-235, May.
    33. Holt, Charles A, 1986. "Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 508-515, June.
    34. Cochard, François & Flage, Alexandre, 2024. "Sharing losses in dictator and ultimatum games: A meta-analysis," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    35. Ert, Eyal & Erev, Ido, 2013. "On the descriptive value of loss aversion in decisions under risk: Six clarifications," Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 214-235, May.
    36. Guido Baltussen & G. Post & Martijn Assem & Peter Wakker, 2012. "Random incentive systems in a dynamic choice experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(3), pages 418-443, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Noémi Berlin & Emmanuel Kemel & Vincent Lenglin & Antoine Nebout, 2025. "Paying none, some or all? Between-subject random incentives and preferences towards risk and time [Ne rien payer, payer une partie ou payer la totalité ? Incitations aléatoires entre sujets et préférences en matière de risque et de temps]," Post-Print hal-05403681, HAL.
    2. Aydogan, Ilke & Berger, Loïc & Théroude, Vincent, 2024. "Pay all subjects or pay only some? An experiment on decision-making under risk and ambiguity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    3. Stephan Jagau & Theo Offerman, 2018. "Defaults, normative anchors, and the occurrence of risky and cautious shifts," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 211-236, June.
    4. Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Palma, Marco & Feldman, Paul, 2024. "Incentives and Payment Mechanisms in Preference Elicitation," MPRA Paper 120898, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Halladay, Brianna, 2016. "Experimental methods: Pay one or pay all," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 141-150.
    6. James Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj & Ulrich Schmidt, 2015. "Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(2), pages 215-250, June.
    7. Emin Karagözoğlu & Ümit Barış Urhan, 2017. "The Effect of Stake Size in Experimental Bargaining and Distribution Games: A Survey," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 285-325, March.
    8. Lisa R. Anderson & Beth A. Freeborn & Patrick McAlvanah & Andrew Turscak, 2023. "Pay every subject or pay only some?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 161-188, April.
    9. Fiore, Annamaria, 2009. "Experimental Economics: Some Methodological Notes," MPRA Paper 12498, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Maria J. Ruiz Martos, 2018. "Sequential Common Consequence Effect and Incentives," ThE Papers 18/04, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    11. Jinkwon Lee, 2007. "Repetition And Financial Incentives In Economics Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 628-681, July.
    12. Guido Baltussen & G. Post & Martijn Assem & Peter Wakker, 2012. "Random incentive systems in a dynamic choice experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(3), pages 418-443, September.
    13. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Han Bleichrodt & Olivier l’Haridon, 2013. "Sign-dependence in intertemporal choice," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 225-253, December.
    14. Yaron Azrieli & Christopher P. Chambers & Paul J. Healy, 2018. "Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1472-1503.
    15. Gruner, Sven & Lehberger, Mira & Hirschauer, Norbert & Mußhoff, Oliver, 2022. "How (un)informative are experiments with students for other social groups? A study of agricultural students and farmers," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 66(03), January.
    16. Robin Cubitt & Gijs van de Kuilen & Sujoy Mukerji, 2020. "Discriminating Between Models of Ambiguity Attitude: a Qualitative Test," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 708-749.
    17. Simon Gächter & Eric J. Johnson & Andreas Herrmann, 2022. "Individual-level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 92(3), pages 599-624, April.
    18. Anna Conte & M. Vittoria Levati & Chiara Nardi, 2018. "Risk Preferences and the Role of Emotions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(338), pages 305-328, April.
    19. Ulrich Schmidt & Christian Seidl, 2014. "Reconsidering the common ratio effect: the roles of compound independence, reduction, and coalescing," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(3), pages 323-339, October.
    20. Jonathan Chapman & Erik Snowberg & Stephanie Wang & Colin Camerer, 2018. "Loss Attitudes in the U.S. Population: Evidence from Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation (DOSE)," CESifo Working Paper Series 7262, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:112:y:2026:i:c:s0167487025000820. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.