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Paying none, some or all? Between-subject random incentives and preferences towards risk and time
[Ne rien payer, payer une partie ou payer la totalité ? Incitations aléatoires entre sujets et préférences en matière de risque et de temps]

Author

Listed:
  • Noémi Berlin

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Emmanuel Kemel

    (GREGHEC - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Vincent Lenglin

    (ANTHROPO LAB - Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Expérimentale - ETHICS EA 7446 - Experience ; Technology & Human Interactions ; Care & Society : - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, ETHICS EA 7446 - Experience ; Technology & Human Interactions ; Care & Society : - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, UCL - Université catholique de Lille)

  • Antoine Nebout

    (UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

In the context of risk and time preferences, the within-subject random incentive system (Within-RIS) is the standard real-incentive mechanism in economic experiments: each subject has one choice randomly selected for payment. In a variation, Within-RIS is applied to a fraction of subjects only: each subject has a probability of being selected and has one choice randomly selected for payment. This paper assesses the validity of this mechanism called the hybrid random incentive system (Hybrid-RIS) by investigating if/how the selection probability affects elicited risk and time preferences. We report an experiment conducted with 335 subjects across four treatments, varying the selection probability to 0, 0.1, 0.5, and 1. Using raw data statistics and structural estimations of preference parameters, we find that elicited time preferences remain stable, while risk aversion is lower when the selection probability is null. However, there are no significant differences among the non-null selection probabilities. These findings suggest that Hybrid-RIS does not distort elicited risk and time preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Noémi Berlin & Emmanuel Kemel & Vincent Lenglin & Antoine Nebout, 2026. "Paying none, some or all? Between-subject random incentives and preferences towards risk and time [Ne rien payer, payer une partie ou payer la totalité ? Incitations aléatoires entre sujets et préf," Post-Print hal-05403681, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05403681
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102870
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