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Myopic prediction, self-destructive secrecy, and the unexpected benefits of revealing final deadlines in negotiation

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  • Moore, Don A.

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  • Moore, Don A., 2004. "Myopic prediction, self-destructive secrecy, and the unexpected benefits of revealing final deadlines in negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 125-139, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:94:y:2004:i:2:p:125-139
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 806-823, September.
    3. Brodt, Susan E., 1994. ""Inside Information" and Negotiator Decision Behavior," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 172-202, May.
    4. Ma, Ching-To Albert & Manove, Michael, 1993. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1313-1339, November.
    5. Wade-Benzoni, Kimberly A. & Tenbrunsel, Ann E. & Bazerman, Max H., 1996. "Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness in Asymmetric, Environmental Social Dilemmas: Explaining Harvesting Behavior and the Role of Communication," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 111-126, August.
    6. Thompson, Leigh & Loewenstein, George, 1992. "Egocentric interpretations of fairness and interpersonal conflict," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 176-197, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Moore, Don A. & Cain, Daylian M., 2007. "Overconfidence and underconfidence: When and why people underestimate (and overestimate) the competition," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 197-213, July.
    2. McCarter, Matthew W. & Wade-Benzoni, Kimberly A. & Kamal, Darcy K. Fudge & Bang, H. Min & Hyde, Steven J. & Maredia, Reshma, 2020. "Models of intragroup conflict in management: A literature review," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 925-946.
    3. Daniels, David P. & Zlatev, Julian J., 2019. "Choice architects reveal a bias toward positivity and certainty," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 132-149.
    4. Malhotra, Deepak, 2010. "The desire to win: The effects of competitive arousal on motivation and behavior," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 139-146, March.
    5. Mitchell, J. Robert & Shepherd, Dean A., 2010. "To thine own self be true: Images of self, images of opportunity, and entrepreneurial action," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 138-154, January.
    6. Radzevick, Joseph R. & Moore, Don A., 2013. "Just how comparative are comparative judgments?," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 80-91.
    7. Marco Serena, 2021. "The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 377-397, June.
    8. repec:awi:wpaper:0700 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Solda, Alice & Ke, Changxia & von Hippel, Bill & Page, Lionel, 2021. "Absolute vs. relative success: Why overconfidence is an inefficient equilibrium," SocArXiv 9jw7a, Center for Open Science.
    10. Moore, Don A., 2007. "Not so above average after all: When people believe they are worse than average and its implications for theories of bias in social comparison," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 42-58, January.
    11. Wendi L. Adair & Jeanne M. Brett, 2005. "The Negotiation Dance: Time, Culture, and Behavioral Sequences in Negotiation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 16(1), pages 33-51, February.

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