A note on public debt, tax-exempt bonds, and Ponzi games
By issuing tax-exempt bonds, the government can incur debt and never pay back any principal or interest, even if the economy without public debt evolves on a dynamically efficient growth path. The welfare effects of such a Ponzi type borrowing scheme are mixed. The current young will unambiguously benefit. Depending on preferences and the aggregate technology, a finite number of subsequent generations may also benefit. However, the welfare of all generations thereafter will be lower than in the economy without public debt.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John Norregaard, 1997. "The Tax Treatment of Government Bonds," IMF Working Papers 97/25, International Monetary Fund.
- Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1499-1528, November.
- Chalk, Nigel A., 2000. "The sustainability of bond-financed deficits: An overlapping generations approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 293-328, April.
- Laurence Ball & Douglas W. Elmendorf & N. Gregory Mankiw, 1995.
"The Deficit Gamble,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1710, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Grossman, G.M. & Yanagawa, N., 1992.
"Asset Bubbles and Endogenous Growth,"
160, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Galor, Oded & Ryder, Harl E., 1991. "Dynamic efficiency of steady-state equilibria in an overlapping-generations model with productive capital," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 385-390, April.
- O'Connell, Stephen A & Zeldes, Stephen P, 1988.
"Rational Ponzi Games,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(3), pages 431-50, August.
- Stephen A. O'Connell & Stephen P. Zeldes, . "Rational Ponzi Games," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 18-86, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- King, Ian & Ferguson, Don, 1993. "Dynamic inefficiency, endogenous growth, and Ponzi games," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 79-104, August.
- Berthold Wigger, 2005. "Public Debt, Human Capital Formation, and Dynamic Inefficiency," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(1), pages 47-59, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:31:y:2009:i:3:p:492-499. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.