Optimal health insurance: the case of observable, severe illness
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Martin Feldstein & Jonathan Gruber, 1995.
"A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform,"
in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 9, pages 103-130
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Garber, Alan M. & Phelps, Charles E., 1997. "Economic foundations of cost-effectiveness analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, February.
- David M. Cutler & Elizabeth Richardson, 1999.
"Your Money and Your Life: The Value of Health and What Affects It,"
NBER Working Papers
6895, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David M. Cutler & Elizabeth Richardson, 1999. "Your Money and Your Life: The Value of Health and What Affects It," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, volume 2, pages 99-132 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-77, June.
- David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "The Determinants of Technological Change in Heart Attack Treatment," NBER Working Papers 5751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 1998.
"Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second Best in Health Care Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
6865, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 2000. "Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 992-1005, October.
- Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
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