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Learning from a black box

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  • Ke, Shaowei
  • Wu, Brian
  • Zhao, Chen

Abstract

We introduce a learning model in which the decision maker does not know how recommendations are generated, called the contraction rule. We present behavioral postulates that characterize it. The contraction rule can be uniquely identified and reveals how the decision maker interprets and how much she trusts the recommendation. In a dynamic stationary setting, we show that the contraction rule is not dominated by completely following recommendations and is incompatible with a property called compliance with balanced recommendations. Following this negative result, we demonstrate that the contraction rule may generate and reinforce recency bias and disagreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Ke, Shaowei & Wu, Brian & Zhao, Chen, 2024. "Learning from a black box," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:221:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124000929
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105886
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul H. Y. Cheung & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2025. "Frame-dependent Random Utility," Papers 2502.00209, arXiv.org.
    2. Elchin Suleymanov, 2025. "Robust Maximum Likelihood Updating," Papers 2504.17151, arXiv.org.

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