Mixed strategy equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate: A comment
This note complements Aragonès and Palfrey (2002)  by providing upper and lower bounds of the equilibrium payoff of the advantaged (disadvantaged) candidate for any symmetric distribution of the median voterʼs ideal policy and any (even or odd) number of equidistant locations. These bounds point to a negative (positive) relationship between the equilibrium payoff of the (dis)advantaged candidate and the uncertainty regarding the median voterʼs preferences.
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