Spatial electoral competition with a probabilistically favored candidate
This paper studies unidimensional electoral competition between two office-motivated candidates, where one of them enjoys a probabilistic and non-policy advantage over the other. We consider a finite number of voters who have single peaked preferences and whose ideal policies are not known to the candidates. Unlike the deterministic-advantage models we find that the Downsian pure strategy equilibrium is in this environment the unique Nash equilibrium of the game when the electorate is sufficiently large.
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- Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. "Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-336, June.
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002.
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Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March.
- Enriqueta Aragonés & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate," Economics Working Papers 502, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas. R., 2000. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate," Working Papers 1102, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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- Gelman, Andrew & King, Gary, 1993. "Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(04), pages 409-451, October.
- Ashworth, Scott & Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 2009. "Elections with platform and valence competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 191-216, September.
- Alexei Zakharov, 2009. "A model of candidate location with endogenous valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 347-366, March.
- Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2012. "Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-480.
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Enriqueta Aragonè & Dimitros Xefteris, "undated". "Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space," Working Papers 529, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2011. "Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 859.11, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2012. "Mixed strategy equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate: A comment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 393-396.
- Roland Kirstein & Georg v. Wangenheim, 2010. "A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Two Independent Probabilities of Error," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201011, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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