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Bargaining in environmental regulation revisited

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  • Arguedas, Carmen

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  • Arguedas, Carmen, 2005. "Bargaining in environmental regulation revisited," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 422-433, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:50:y:2005:i:2:p:422-433
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 133-148, April.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Shavell, Steven, 1992. "A note on marginal deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 345-355, September.
    4. Harford, Jon D. & Harrington, Winston, 1991. "A reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 391-395, August.
    5. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1996. "Bargaining in Environmental Regulation and the Ideal Regulator," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 233-253, March.
    6. Heyes, Anthony G., 1996. "Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 251-265, May.
    7. Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 93-128, Spring.
    8. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
    9. Heyes, Anthony, 2000. "Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 107-129, March.
    10. Carmen Arguedas & Hamid Hamoudi, 2004. "Controlling Pollution with Relaxed Regulations," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 85-104, July.
    11. Grieson, Ronald E. & Singh, Nirvikar, 1990. "Regulating externalities through testing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 369-387, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Seifert, Jacob, 2013. "Compulsory Licensing, Innovation and Welfare," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79778, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Cobourn, Kelly M. & Amacher, Gregory S. & Elbakidze, Levan, 2015. "Bargaining for recharge: an analysis of cooperating and conjunctive surface water-groundwater management," 2016 Allied Social Science Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 3-5, 2016, San Francisco, California 212843, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. André, Francisco J. & Sokri, Abderrahmane & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Public Disclosure Programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 212(1), pages 199-212, July.
    4. Glachant, Matthieu, 2007. "Non-binding voluntary agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 32-48, July.
    5. Carmen Arguedas, 2008. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 155-168, October.
    6. Jacob Seifert, 2015. "Welfare effects of compulsory licensing," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 317-350, December.
    7. Carmen Arguedas, 2013. "Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 156-176, October.
    8. repec:kap:regeco:v:51:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11149-017-9330-1 is not listed on IDEAS

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