IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v90y2013isps128-s140.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Darwin's invisible hand: Market competition, evolution and the firm

Author

Listed:
  • Johnson, Dominic D.P.
  • Price, Michael E.
  • Van Vugt, Mark

Abstract

Competition among firms has been suggested to reflect the ruthless logic of Darwinian selection: a free market is a struggle for survival, in which successful firms survive and unsuccessful ones die. This view appears to bolster three pillars of neoclassical economics: (1) that economic actors are self-interested; (2) that self-interest leads to public goods (Adam Smith's “invisible hand”); and (3) that together these lead to market optimization. However, this chain of reasoning leads to a paradox. We show that the application of Darwinian selection to competition among firms (as opposed to among individuals) invokes group selection, which leads to exactly the opposite predictions: notably altruism and the suppression of individual self-interest. We apply an alternative evolutionary model of economic competition, multi-level selection (MLS) theory, which integrates the effects of selection at both individual and group levels. This approach reveals that, while individuals may generally pursue their own self-interest (as in the standard evolutionary account), humans also have evolved traits that—as if led by an invisible hand—steer our self-interest to align with the good of the firm or wider society as well. But it is the hand of Darwin, not Smith.

Suggested Citation

  • Johnson, Dominic D.P. & Price, Michael E. & Van Vugt, Mark, 2013. "Darwin's invisible hand: Market competition, evolution and the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(S), pages 128-140.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:90:y:2013:i:s:p:s128-s140
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.016
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268112002752
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.016?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gowdy, John M. & Dollimore, Denise E. & Wilson, David Sloan & Witt, Ulrich, 2013. "Economic cosmology and the evolutionary challenge," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(S), pages 11-20.
    2. Henrich, Joseph, 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 3-35, January.
    3. Jan Fagerberg, 2003. "Schumpeter and the revival of evolutionary economics: an appraisal of the literature," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 125-159, April.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2002. "Altruistic punishment in humans," Nature, Nature, vol. 415(6868), pages 137-140, January.
    5. Andrew Gelman & Lane Kenworthy & Yu-Sung Su, 2010. "Income Inequality and Partisan Voting in the United States," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(s1), pages 1203-1219.
    6. Michael E. Price & Dominic D. P. Johnson, 2011. "The Adaptationist Theory of Cooperation in Groups: Evolutionary Predictions for Organizational Cooperation," Springer Books, in: Gad Saad (ed.), Evolutionary Psychology in the Business Sciences, pages 95-133, Springer.
    7. John Tooby & Leda Cosmides & Michael E. Price, 2006. "Cognitive adaptations for n-person exchange: the evolutionary roots of organizational behavior," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2-3), pages 103-129.
    8. Richard Nelson, 2012. "Why Schumpeter has had so little influence on today’s main line economics, and why this may be changing," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(5), pages 901-916, November.
    9. Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring," Nature, Nature, vol. 393(6685), pages 573-577, June.
    10. Gintis, Herbert, 2007. "The evolution of private property," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-16, September.
    11. M.A. Nowak & K. Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring/ The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity," Working Papers ir98040, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    12. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2003. "The nature of human altruism," Nature, Nature, vol. 425(6960), pages 785-791, October.
    13. Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, 2005. "Evolution of indirect reciprocity," Nature, Nature, vol. 437(7063), pages 1291-1298, October.
    14. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    15. Veblen, Thorstein, 1898. "Why Economics is not an Evolutionary Science," History of Economic Thought Articles, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, vol. 12.
    16. Dan Lovallo & Colin Camerer, 1999. "Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 306-318, March.
    17. Johan J Bolhuis & Gillian R Brown & Robert C Richardson & Kevin N Laland, 2011. "Darwin in Mind: New Opportunities for Evolutionary Psychology," Working Papers id:4376, eSocialSciences.
    18. Andrew Gelman & Lane Kenworthy & Yu‐Sung Su, 2010. "Income Inequality and Partisan Voting in the United States," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1203-1219, December.
    19. van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. & Gowdy, John M., 2009. "A group selection perspective on economic behavior, institutions and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 1-20, October.
    20. Ulrich Witt, 2003. "The Evolving Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2477.
    21. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    22. Bruno S. Frey, 1994. "How Intrinsic Motivation is Crowded out and in," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(3), pages 334-352, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mark Van Vugt, 2017. "Evolutionary psychology: theoretical foundations for the study of organizations," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 6(1), pages 1-16, December.
    2. Filipe Nobre Faria, 2017. "Is market liberalism adaptive? Rethinking F. A. Hayek on moral evolution," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 307-326, October.
    3. Su, Tong-Yaa, 2016. "Competition between Firms in Economic Evolution: Its Characteristics and Differences to the Biological Sphere," MPRA Paper 72756, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Juan Barrios, 2015. "“I Think Competition is Better Than You Do: Does It Make Me Happier?” Evidence from the World Value Surveys," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 599-618, June.
    5. Chang, Rui-Dong & Zuo, Jian & Zhao, Zhen-Yu & Zillante, George & Gan, Xiao-Long & Soebarto, Veronica, 2017. "Evolving theories of sustainability and firms: History, future directions and implications for renewable energy research," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 48-56.
    6. Andres F. Jola‐Sanchez, 2022. "How does warfare affect firms' productivity?," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(5), pages 1940-1962, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bogliacino, Francesco & Codagnone, Cristiano, 2021. "Microfoundations, behaviour, and evolution: Evidence from experiments," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 372-385.
    2. D. Darcet & D. Sornette, 2008. "Quantitative determination of the level of cooperation in the presence of punishment in three public good experiments," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 3(2), pages 137-163, December.
    3. Shade T. Shutters, 2009. "Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of fair allocations in a simulated ultimatum game," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 64-77, June.
    4. Si, Zehua & He, Zhixue & Shen, Chen & Tanimoto, Jun, 2023. "Speculative defectors as unexpected insulators of super cooperators in structured populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    5. Isamu Okada, 2020. "A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-17, July.
    6. Giangiacomo Bravo & Lucia Tamburino, 2008. "The Evolution of Trust in Non-Simultaneous Exchange Situations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(1), pages 85-113, February.
    7. Wang, Xianjia & Ding, Rui & Zhao, Jinhua & Gu, Cuiling, 2022. "The rise and fall of cooperation in populations with multiple groups," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 413(C).
    8. Podobnik, Boris & Gabor, Andrijana Musura & Kirbis, Ivona Skreblin, 2019. "Scale-free growth of human society based on cooperation and altruistic punishment," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 513(C), pages 613-619.
    9. Egas, Martijn & Riedl, Arno, 2005. "The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation," IZA Discussion Papers 1646, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Simon Gaechter & Benedikt Herrmann, 2008. "Reciprocity, culture, and human cooperation: Previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment," Discussion Papers 2008-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    12. Yu, Tongkui & Chen, Shu-Heng & Li, Honggang, 2011. "Social Norm, Costly Punishment and the Evolution to Cooperation," MPRA Paper 28814, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2009. "Counterpunishment revisited: an evolutionary approach," MPRA Paper 16923, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Ding, Rui & Wang, Xianjia & Liu, Yang & Zhao, Jinhua & Gu, Cuiling, 2023. "Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks under an external incentive mechanism," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    15. Wang, Xianjia & Ding, Rui & Zhao, Jinhua & Chen, Wenman & Gu, Cuiling, 2022. "Competition of punishment and reward among inequity-averse individuals in spatial public goods games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    16. Wubben, Maarten J.J. & Cremer, David De & Dijk, Eric van, 2011. "The communication of anger and disappointment helps to establish cooperation through indirect reciprocity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 489-501, June.
    17. Ding, Rui & Wang, Xianjia & Zhao, Jinhua & Gu, Cuiling & Wang, Tao, 2023. "The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games under a risk-transfer mechanism," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    18. Swami Iyer & Timothy Killingback, 2020. "Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Assortative Interactions," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-31, September.
    19. Simon Gaechter & Benedikt Herrmann, 2008. "Reciprocity, culture, and human cooperation: Previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment," Discussion Papers 2008-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    20. Cubitt, Robin P. & Drouvelis, Michalis & Gächter, Simon & Kabalin, Ruslan, 2011. "Moral judgments in social dilemmas: How bad is free riding?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 253-264.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolution; Competition; Cooperation; Darwin; Human nature; Firms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • Y80 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Related Disciplines - - - Related Disciplines

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:90:y:2013:i:s:p:s128-s140. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.