Do managers work harder in competitive industries?
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
- Martin Stephen, 1993. "Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 445-450, April.
- Flavio Delbono & Vincenzo Denicolo, 1991. "Incentives to Innovate in a Cournot Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(3), pages 951-961.
- Nalebuff, Barry J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1983. "Information, Competition, and Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 278-283, May.
- Luporini, Annalisa & Parigi, Bruno, 1996. "Multi-Task Sharecropping Contracts: The Italian Mezzadria," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(251), pages 445-457, August.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1994.
"Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical Firms Choose Different Incentives for Their Managers,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 518-537, Winter.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin., 1992. "Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical Firms Choose Different Incentives for Their Managers," Economics Working Papers 92-193, University of California at Berkeley.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E., 1992. "Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical Firms Choose Different Incentives for Their Managers," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4v4548gz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Slade, Margaret E, 1996. "Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(2), pages 465-486, May.
- Tom Lee & Louis L. Wilde, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 429-436.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
- Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
- Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987.
"Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,"
Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- William Novshek, 1980. "Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(3), pages 473-486.
- Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-1199, December.
- Horn, Henrik & Lang, Harald & Lundgren, Stefan, 1994.
"Competition, long run contracts and internal inefficiencies in firms,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 213-233, February.
- Horn, H. & Lang, H. & Lundgren, S., 1991. "Competition, Long Run Contracts and Internal Inefficiencies in Firms," Papers 506, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Vickers, John, 1995. "Concepts of Competition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 1-23, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dietl, Helmut M. & Grossmann, Martin & Lang, Markus & Wey, Simon, 2013.
"Incentive effects of bonus taxes in a principal-agent model,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 93-104.
- Helmut Dietl & Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang & Simon Wey, 2010. "Incentive Effects of Bonus Taxes in a Principal-Agent Model," Working Papers 0140, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Feb 2012.
- Helmut M. Dietl & Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang & Simon Wey, 2012. "Incentive Effects of Bonus Taxes in a Principal-Agent Model," Working Papers 313, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW).
- Papa, Gianluca & Speciale, Biagio, 2011. "Financial leverage and managerial compensation: Evidence from the UK," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 36-46, March.
- Stefan Beiner & Markus Schmid & Gabrielle Wanzenried, 2004. "Product Market Competition, Managerial Inventives, and Firm Valuation," Diskussionsschriften dp0412, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Güth, Werner & Pull, Kerstin & Stadler, Manfred, 2014. "Delegation, worker compensation, and strategic competition," University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 67, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences.
- Yuk Ying Chang & Martin Young, 2015. "Dissipative Competition: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 15(2), pages 169-198, June.
- Andergassen, Rainer, 2016. "Managerial compensation, product market competition and fraud," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-15.
- Moses Acquaah, 2003. "Corporate Management, Industry Competition and the Sustainability of Firm Abnormal Profitability," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(1), pages 57-85, March.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:34:y:1998:i:3:p:489-498. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .