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Spite and preemptive retaliation after tournaments

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  • Jauernig, Johanna
  • Uhl, Matthias

Abstract

We investigated money burning after tournaments. First, we show that substantial money burning was triggered if participants perceived a situation as competitive. Second, we investigated to which extent aggression between former contestants was motivated by preemptive retaliation or spite. To disentangle both motives, we introduced a credible and visible self-binding signal. Contrary to previous studies, we found that aggression against a defenceless subject played an important role. Preemptive retaliation proved to be another dominant motive. We conclude that voluntary self-binding signals may have the potential to mitigate but not eliminate antisocial behavior after a competition, because it seems to be driven by spite to a large extent. Our results help us to better understand and eventually mitigate destructive behavior in work environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Jauernig, Johanna & Uhl, Matthias, 2019. "Spite and preemptive retaliation after tournaments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 328-336.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:158:y:2019:i:c:p:328-336
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Jauernig, Johanna & Uhl, Matthias & Luetge, Christoph, 2016. "Competition-induced punishment of winners and losers: Who is the target?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 13-25.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition; Tournaments; Money burning; Preemptive retaliation; Spite; Self-binding;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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