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Small business groups enhance performance and promote stability, not expropriation. Evidence from French SMEs

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  • Hamelin, Anaïs

Abstract

This paper investigates the influence that a firm's distance from control has on its performance, using balance sheet information and a unique data set on small business ownership. This study fills a gap in the empirical governance literature by investigating whether there is expropriation of minority shareholders in small business groups. Contrary to observations for large business groups, results show a positive relationship between the separation of control from ownership and firm performance. Results also underline that tunneling promotes controlling shareholders' profit stability rather than profit maximization in small business groups.

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  • Hamelin, Anaïs, 2011. "Small business groups enhance performance and promote stability, not expropriation. Evidence from French SMEs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 613-626, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:3:p:613-626
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    Cited by:

    1. Enrico Guzzini & Donato Iacobucci, 2014. "Ownership as R&D incentive in business groups," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 119-135, June.
    2. Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar & Selarka, Ekta, 2012. "Does ownership concentration improve M&A outcomes in emerging markets?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 717-726.
    3. Enrico Guzzini & Donato Iacobucci, 2012. "Business group affiliation and R&D propensity," Working Papers 1203, c.MET-05 - Centro Interuniversitario di Economia Applicata alle Politiche per L'industria, lo Sviluppo locale e l'Internazionalizzazione.
    4. Nehme Azoury & Elie Bouri, 2015. "Principal–principal conflicts in Lebanese unlisted family firms," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(2), pages 461-493, May.
    5. Panagiotis Avramidis & Ioannis Asimakopoulos & Dimitris Malliaropulos & Nickolaos G. Travlos, 2017. "Group affiliation in periods of credit contraction and bank’s reaction: evidence from the Greek crisis," Working Papers 237, Bank of Greece.
    6. Anaïs HAMELIN, 2013. "Does Size Matter? Firm And Business Group Size Influence On The Benefits Of Group Affiliation," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2013-10, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    7. Dong Xiang & Andrew C. Worthington & Helen Higgs, 2011. "Firm-level determinants and impacts of finance-seeking behaviour and outcomes for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Australia," Discussion Papers in Finance finance:201115, Griffith University, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ownership Control Tunneling Small business Performance;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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