Does collateral fuel moral hazard in banking?
This paper presents two models in which the fluctuating value of loan collateral (real estate) generates the problem of moral hazard between a bank and a deposit insurance agent. The bank finances risky projects against collateral and relies on the rising collateral value. If the collateral value later appreciates, the bank enjoys handsome profits; otherwise, the bank fails. The findings are rather consistent with the characteristics of the topical subprime mortgage crisis.
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