Optimal parole decisions1
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Citations
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Cited by:
- C. McDougall & M. Cohen & R. Swaray & A. Perry, 2008. "Benefit‐Cost Analyses of Sentencing," Campbell Systematic Reviews, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(1), pages 1-86.
- Stéphane Mechoulan & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2015. "Assessing Racial Disparities in Parole Release," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 39-74.
- repec:clg:wpaper:2009-06 is not listed on IDEAS
- Mitchell Polinsky, A., 2015.
"Deterrence and the optimality of rewarding prisoners for good behavior,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-7.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2015. "Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for Good Behavior," Discussion Papers 15-023, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Sahuguet, Nicolas & Mechoulan, Stéphane, 2011. "Assessing Racial Discrimination in Parole Release," CEPR Discussion Papers 8506, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Volker Meier, 2001.
"On Prison and Therapy,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 47-56, July.
- Meier, Volker, 2001. "On prison and therapy," Munich Reprints in Economics 19189, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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