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On Prison and Therapy

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  • Volker Meier

Abstract

This paper analyzes the choice of punishment levels where therapy and pure imprisonment are the two types of treatment. The incidence of a repeat offense depends on the offender’s criminal energy in a stochastic fashion. Therapy increases the depreciation rate of criminal energy. A combination of the two treatment types is never chosen since they constitute strong substitutes.
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Suggested Citation

  • Volker Meier, 2001. "On Prison and Therapy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 47-56, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:12:y:2001:i:1:p:47-56
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1011248528535
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    1. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
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    7. O'Flaherty, Brendan, 1998. "Why Repeated Criminal Opportunities Matter: A Dynamic Stochastic Analysis of Criminal Decision Making," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 232-255, October.
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    Keywords

    criminal law; optimal punishment;

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