Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Repeat Offenders
This paper develops an economic model of criminal enforcement that combines the goals of deterrence and incapacitation. Potential offenders commit an initial criminal act if the present value of net private gains is positive. A fraction of these offenders become habitual and commit further crimes immediately upon release from their initial prison term (if any). The optimal punishment scheme in this setting generally involves a finite prison term for first-time offenders (based on the goal of deterrence), and an infinite (life) sentence for repeat offenders (based on the goal of incapacitation).
|Date of creation:||Oct 2008|
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- Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, 2004.
"A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders,"
2004-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Miceli Thomas J. & Bucci Catherine, 2005. "A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 71-80, April.
- Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, 1998.
"Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation,"
NBER Working Papers
6484, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kessler, Daniel P & Levitt, Steven D, 1999. "Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 343-363, April.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169-169.
- Emons, Winand, 2003.
"A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 253-259, September.
- Winand Emons, 2001. "A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0104, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
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"A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders,"
NBER Working Papers
3739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chu, C. Y. Cyrus & Hu, Sheng-cheng & Huang, Ting-yuan, 2000. "Punishing repeat offenders more severely," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 127-140, March.
- Glenn C. Loury, 1979.
"Market Structure and Innovation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
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- Davis, Michael L, 1988. "Time and Punishment: An Intertemporal Model of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(2), pages 383-390, April.
- Ehrlich, Isaac, 1981. "On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation, and Deterrence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 307-322, June.
- Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-979, December.
- Shavell, Steven, 1987. "A Model of Optimal Incapacitation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 107-110, May.
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