A model of criminal sanctions that incorporate both deterrence and incapacitation
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References listed on IDEAS
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ullman, Darin F., 2016. "Locked and not loaded: First time offenders and state ignition interlock programs," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-13.
- Peter Wijck, 2013. "The economics of pre-crime interventions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 441-458, June.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2012. "Escalating Interest in Escalating Penalties," Working papers 2012-08, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Miceli Thomas J., 2012.
"Deterred or Detained? A Unified Model of Criminal Punishment,"
Review of Law & Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, March.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Deterred or Detained? A Unified Model of Criminal Punishment," Working papers 2009-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Stan Miles & Derek Pyne, 2015. "Deterring repeat offenders with escalating penalty schedules: a Bayesian approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 229-250, August.
- Steven Shavell, 2014. "A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation," NBER Working Papers 20747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Guha, Brishti, 2012. "Pirates and fishermen: Is less patrolling always bad?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 29-38.
- Shavell, Steven, 2015. "A simple model of optimal deterrence and incapacitation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 13-19.
- Matteo Rizzolli & James Tremewan, 2016. "Hard Labour in the lab: Are monetary and non-monetary sanctions really substitutable?," Vienna Economics Papers 1606, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
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KeywordsCrime Deterrence Incapacitation Law enforcement;
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