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Regulation as a cause of firm fragmentation:the case of the Spanish construction industry

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  • Gonzalez, Manuel
  • Arrunada, Benito
  • Fernandez, Alberto

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  • Gonzalez, Manuel & Arrunada, Benito & Fernandez, Alberto, 1998. "Regulation as a cause of firm fragmentation:the case of the Spanish construction industry," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 433-450, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:4:p:433-450
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benito Arruñada & Manuel González, 1997. "How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms," Economics Working Papers 261, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    2. Cheung, Steven N S, 1983. "The Contractual Nature of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, April.
    3. Eccles, Robert G., 1981. "The quasifirm in the construction industry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 335-357, December.
    4. Lyons, Bruce R & Sekkat, Khalid, 1991. "Strategic Bargaining and Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 577-593, September.
    5. Zimmerman, Jerold L., 1983. "Taxes and firm size," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 119-149, April.
    6. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    7. Bronars, Stephen G & Deere, Donald R, 1993. "Unionization, Incomplete Contracting, and Capital Investment," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(1), pages 117-132, January.
    8. Oliver E. Williamson & Scott E Masten (ed.), . "The Economics of Transaction Costs," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1652.
    9. José Luis Malo de Molina, 1983. "¿Rigidez o flexibilidad del mercado de trabajo? La experiencia española durante la crisis," Estudios Económicos, Banco de España, number 34.
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    1. Gil, Ricard & Marion, Justin, 2009. "The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt6ds5d1pp, University of California Transportation Center.
    2. Gonzalez-Diaz, Manuel & Arrunada, Benito & Fernandez, Alberto, 2000. "Causes of subcontracting: evidence from panel data on construction firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 167-187, June.
    3. Benito Arruñada & Luis Vázquez & Giorgio Zanarone, 2009. "Institutional constraints on organizations: the case of Spanish car dealerships," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 15-26.
    4. Miller, Amalia R. & Eibner, Christine & Gresenz, Carole Roan, 2013. "Financing of employer sponsored health insurance plans before and after health reform: What consumers don’t know won’t hurt them?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 36-47.

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