A conceptual model for segregation of duties: Integrating theory and practice for manual and IT-supported processes
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DOI: 10.1016/j.accinf.2014.05.003
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- Rosemary Kim & Jagdish Gangolly & S. S. Ravi & Daniel J. Rosenkrantz, 2020. "Formal Analysis of Segregation of Duties (SoD) in Accounting: A Computational Approach," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 56(2), pages 165-212, June.
- Blanche Steyn & Farai Kwenda & Lesley Stainbank, 2020. "Do board-level controls matter? – An agency perspective on socially responsible investment (SRI) company boards in South Africa," South African Journal of Accounting Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(3), pages 205-235, September.
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