Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games
We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most cnlogn steps for some constant c>0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1−e−c′n for some constant c′>0.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003.
"Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, 05.
- Benaim, Michel & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2000. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Working Paper Series 534, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 30 Oct 2001.
- Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour, 2013. "How Long To Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity Of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 10, pages 215-249 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Hart, Sergiu & Mansour, Yishay, 2010. "How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 107-126, May.
- Ely, Jeffrey C. & Sandholm, William H., 2005. "Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 83-109, October.
- Rashid, Salim, 1983. "Equilibrium points of non-atomic games : Asymptotic results," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 7-10.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
- Blonski, Matthias, 1999. "Anonymous Games with Binary Actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 171-180, August.
- Itai Arieli & H Peyton Young, 2011. "Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games," Economics Series Working Papers 570, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:130-144. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.