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Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games

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  • Babichenko, Yakov

Abstract

We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most cnlogn steps for some constant c>0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1−e−c′n for some constant c′>0.

Suggested Citation

  • Babichenko, Yakov, 2013. "Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 130-144.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:130-144
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour, 2013. "How Long To Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity Of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 10, pages 215-249 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    5. Blonski, Matthias, 1999. "Anonymous Games with Binary Actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 171-180, August.
    6. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Sandholm, William H., 2005. "Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 83-109, October.
    7. Itai Arieli & H Peyton Young, 2011. "Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games," Economics Series Working Papers 570, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anonymous games; Best-reply dynamic; Rate of convergence;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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