Assignment markets with the same core
In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a finite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a characterization of the minimal elements. A sufficient condition under which the join-semilattice reduces to a lattice is also given.
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- Nunez, Marina & Rafels, Carles, 2003. "Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 311-331, August.
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