Securities class actions in the US banking sector: Between investor protection and bank stability
This paper investigates whether securities class actions (SCAs) can play a role in banking supervision, both as a warning signal of insolvency and as an instrument of market discipline to encourage bank managers to carefully evaluate risk. Two groups of US banks are compared over the 2000â2008 period. One includes banks that have faced at least one SCA, while the other is composed of non-targeted banks (control group). Results indicate that collective private litigation procedures are more frequently directed at financially fragile intermediaries exhibiting inadequate governance standards. Furthermore, banks which have been subjected to SCAs are likely to reduce their excessive risk positions. This supports the idea that SCAs could be efficiently employed as a complement to public supervisory activity in the banking sector.
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