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Protecting the borrower: An experiment in colonial India

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  • Chaudhary, Latika
  • Swamy, Anand V.

Abstract

We study the impact of the Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act (DARA), a key legislation to protect debtors that was enacted in western colonial India. Using a panel dataset and a difference-in-difference estimation, we find a substantial short-run decline in mortgage-backed credit after the passage of DARA. The contraction in credit did not reduce cropped area or agricultural investments in bullocks and carts, but may have led to less intensive cultivation.

Suggested Citation

  • Chaudhary, Latika & Swamy, Anand V., 2017. "Protecting the borrower: An experiment in colonial India," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 36-54.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:65:y:2017:i:c:p:36-54
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2016.07.004
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    2. Maanik Nath, 2022. "Credit risk in colonial India," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 75(2), pages 396-420, May.

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