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Profiling childhood disability: the reliability of the educational needs questionnaire

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  • Dyson, Maree
  • Allen, Felicity
  • Duckett, Stephen

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  • Dyson, Maree & Allen, Felicity & Duckett, Stephen, 2000. "Profiling childhood disability: the reliability of the educational needs questionnaire," Evaluation and Program Planning, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 177-185, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:epplan:v:23:y:2000:i:2:p:177-185
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    1. Ching‐To Albert Ma & Michael H. Riordan, 2002. "Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 81-107, March.
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