Healt care network formation and policyholders'welfare
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- Bardey David & Bourgeon Jean-Marc, 2011. "Health Care Network Formation and Policyholders' Welfare," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 1-20, January.
- Bardey, David & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2010. "Health Care Network Formation and Policyholders' Welfare," TSE Working Papers 10-183, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Sorek Gilad, 2016.
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- Gilad Sorek, 2015. "Health Insurance and Competition in Health Care Markets," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2015-03, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
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More about this item
KeywordsHealth Care Network; Horizontal Differentiation; HealthCare Quality;
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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