Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare: Evidence from Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand
In: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 7
This paper describes three prototypical systems of therapeutic reference pricing (RP) for pharmaceuticalsGermany, the Netherlands, and New Zealandand examines their effects on the availability of new drugs, reimbursement levels, manufacturer prices, and out-of-pocket surcharges to patients. RPfor pharmaceuticals is not simply analogous to a defined contribution approach to subsidizing insurance coverage. Although a major purpose of RPis to stimulate competition, theory suggests that the achievement of this goal is unlikely, and this is confirmed by the empirical evidence. Other effects of RPdiffer across countries in predictable ways, reflecting each countrys system design and other cost-control policies. New Zealands RPsystem has reduced reimbursement and limited the availability of new drugs, particularly more expensive drugs. Compared to these three countries, if RP were applied in the United States, it would likely have a more negative effect on prices of on-patent products because of the more competitive U.S. generic market, and on research and development (R&D) and the future supply of new drugs, because of the much larger U.S. share of global pharmaceutical sales.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|This chapter was published in: ||This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number
9868.||Handle:|| RePEc:nbr:nberch:9868||Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lopez-Casasnovas, Guillem & Puig-Junoy, Jaume, 2000.
"Review of the literature on reference pricing,"
Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 87-123, November.
- Guillem López & Jaume Puig, 1999. "Review of the literature on reference pricing," Working Papers, Research Center on Health and Economics 362, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Guillem López & Jaume Puig, 1999. "Review of the literature on reference pricing," Economics Working Papers 362, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Ching-To Albert Ma & Michael H. Riordan, 2002.
"Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 81-107, 03.
- repec:spr:pharme:v:19:y:2001:i:4:p:365-377 is not listed on IDEAS
- Fiona Scott Morton, 1997. "The Strategic Response by Pharmaceutical Firms to the Medicaid Most-Favored-Customer Rules," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 269-290, Summer.
- Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
- Nina Pavcnik, 2002. "Do Pharmaceutical Prices Respond to Potential Patient Out-of-Pocket Expenses?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(3), pages 469-487, Autumn.
- Danzon, Patricia M. & Chao, Li-Wei, 2000. "Cross-national price differences for pharmaceuticals: how large, and why?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 159-195, March.
- Zweifel, Peter & Crivelli, Luca, 1996. "Price Regulation of Drugs: Lessons from Germany," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 257-73, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:9868. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.