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The effects of banking market structure on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash

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  • Li, Shengfeng
  • Han, Liang
  • Mi, Biao

Abstract

We investigate the impact of the local banking market structure on the level of corporate cash holdings and the value of cash. We find that, in more concentrated banking markets, firms increase their cash holdings by issuing more equity. The marginal value of $1 cash increases by 10 cents with a one-standard-deviation increase in bank concentration. The positive relationship between bank concentration and value of cash is robust to a rich set of tests such as for firms having access to bond markets or firms using syndicated loans and is more prominent for more financially constrained firms. We also explore the mechanism, and our results suggest that in more concentrated banking markets firms demand more cash to shield against default risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Shengfeng & Han, Liang & Mi, Biao, 2024. "The effects of banking market structure on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:empfin:v:75:y:2024:i:c:s0927539823001275
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101460
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking market structure; Bank concentration; Supply of capital; Cash holdings; Value of cash; Default risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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