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On the core of multiple longest traveling salesman games

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  • Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza
  • Borm, Peter
  • Hamers, Herbert

Abstract

In this paper we introduce multiple longest traveling salesman (MLTS) games. An MLTS game arises from a network in which a salesman has to visit each node (player) precisely once, except its home location, in an order that maximizes the total reward.First it is shown that the value of a coalition of an MLTS game is determined by taking the maximum of suitable combinations of one and two person coalitions.Secondly it is shown that MLTS games with ¯ve or less players have a nonempty core.However, a six player MLTS game may have an empty core.For the special instance where the reward between a pair of nodes is equal to 0 or 1, we provide relations between the structure of the core and the underlying network.
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Suggested Citation

  • Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza & Borm, Peter & Hamers, Herbert, 2006. "On the core of multiple longest traveling salesman games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 174(3), pages 1816-1827, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:174:y:2006:i:3:p:1816-1827
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Le Breton, M & Owen, G & Weber, S, 1992. "Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 419-427.
    2. Potters, J.A.M. & Curiel, I. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "Traveling salesman games," Other publications TiSEM 0dd4cf3d-25fa-4179-80f6-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    1. Grabisch, Michel & Li, Tong, 2011. "On the set of imputations induced by the k-additive core," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 214(3), pages 697-702, November.
    2. Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Peter Borm & Marc Meertens & Hans Reijnierse, 2009. "On the core of routing games with revenues," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 291-304, June.

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