The role of MFN under asymmetries in environmental standards
We critically examine the implications of the most favored nation (MFN) clause under asymmetric environmental standards. Using an oligopolistic intra-industry trade model, we show that environmentally beneficial trade diversion and higher world welfare obtain under tariff discrimination relative to MFN.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Engel, Stefanie, 2004. "Achieving environmental goals in a world of trade and hidden action: the role of trade policies and eco-labeling," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 1122-1145, November.
- Hong Hwang & Chao-Cheng Mai, 1991. "Optimum Discriminatory Tariffs under Oligopolistic Competition," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(3), pages 693-702, August.
- Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November.
- Kennedy Peter W., 1994. "Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 49-63, July.
- Saggi, Kamal, 2004. "Tariffs and the most favored nation clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 341-368, July.
- Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985.
"Export subsidies and international market share rivalry,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fischer, Carolyn & Hoffmann, Sandra & Yoshino , Yutaka, 2002. "Multilateral Trade Agreements and Market-Based Environmental Policies," Discussion Papers dp-02-28, Resources For the Future.
- Ulph, Alistair, 1996. "Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers Act Strategically," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-281, May.
- Kamal Saggi & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2005. "An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 242-254, February.
- Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2001. "Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation clause," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 233-279, June.
- Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C, 2001. "Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most Favoured Nation Clause," CEPR Discussion Papers 2859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Conrad Klaus, 1993. "Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 121-135, September.
- Choi, Jay Pil, 1995. "Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology Discriminatory tariffs vs. the 'Most Favored Nation' clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 143-160, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:93:y:2006:i:2:p:297-304. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.