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Giving versus taking for a cause

Author

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  • Grossman, Philip J.
  • Eckel, Catherine C.

Abstract

This study focuses on subjects’ willingness to give to and take from a charity. We implement a “real donation” Dictator Game with initial endowments allocated in one of two ways: all to the subjects or all to the charity. Subjects are allowed to redistribute the endowments as they wish. We find that the initial allocation is irrelevant; final donations to the charities are nearly identical, in sharp contrast to similar research with an anonymous student recipient. Our findings imply that such framing no longer matters when a charity is substituted for an anonymous individual in the dictator setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Grossman, Philip J. & Eckel, Catherine C., 2015. "Giving versus taking for a cause," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 28-30.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:132:y:2015:i:c:p:28-30
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James Andreoni, 1995. "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(1), pages 1-21.
    2. Li, Sherry Xin & Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J. & Brown, Tara Larson, 2011. "Giving to government: Voluntary taxation in the lab," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(9-10), pages 1190-1201, October.
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    4. Christina M. Fong & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2009. "What Determines Giving to Hurricane Katrina Victims? Experimental Evidence on Racial Group Loyalty," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 64-87, April.
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    11. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Joo Young Jeon & Bibhas Saha, 2017. "Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 474-483, October.
    12. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October.
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    14. Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, 2006. "Subsidizing Charitable Giving with Rebates or Matching: Further Laboratory Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(4), pages 794-807, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Giving; Taking; Charity; Altruism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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