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Common agency with caring agents

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  • Boultzis, Ilias

Abstract

This paper considers two extensions to the standard common agency model. First, the agent’s objective need not be increasing in contributions. Second, the agent can (partially) reject contributions from the principals. Following these extensions, I generalize the concept of truthful equilibria and their key properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Boultzis, Ilias, 2015. "Common agency with caring agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 71-74.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:71-74
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. Campante, Filipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco H.G., 2007. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 993-1021, June.
    3. Martimort David & Stole Lars, 2003. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-40, July.
    4. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    5. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-769, August.
    6. Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Endogenous Lobbying," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 180-215, March.
    7. Chiu Yu Ko, 2011. "Menu Auctions with Non-Transferable Utilities and Budget Constraints," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 787, Boston College Department of Economics.
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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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