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On the impulse in impulse learning

Author

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  • Ding, Jieyao
  • Nicklisch, Andreas

Abstract

This paper experimentally investigates the nature of impulses in impulse learning. Particularly, we analyze whether positive feedback (i.e., yielding a superior payoff in a game) or negative feedback (i.e., yielding an inferior payoff in a game) leads to a systematic change in the individual choices. The results reveal that subjects predominantly learn from negative feedback.

Suggested Citation

  • Ding, Jieyao & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2013. "On the impulse in impulse learning," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 294-297.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:2:p:294-297
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chmura, Thorsten & Goerg, Sebastian J. & Selten, Reinhard, 2012. "Learning in experimental 2×2 games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 44-73.
    2. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
    3. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
    4. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    5. Beggs, A.W., 2005. "On the convergence of reinforcement learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 1-36, May.
    6. Rick, Scott & Weber, Roberto A., 2010. "Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 716-730, March.
    7. Reinhard Selten & Thorsten Chmura, 2008. "Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2-Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 938-966, June.
    8. Brit Grosskopf, 2003. "Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(2), pages 141-158, October.
    9. Vulkan, Nir, 2000. " An Economist's Perspective on Probability Matching," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 101-118, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. William Neilson & Michael Price & Mikhael Shor, 2016. "Nudging Backward Induction," Working papers 2016-31, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    2. Sebastian J. Goerg & Tibor Neugebauer & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2016. "Impulse Response Dynamics in Weakest Link Games," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 284-297, August.
    3. Nax, Heinrich H., 2015. "Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65426, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Feedback; Impulse; Learning; Maximin value; Reinforcement;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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